now or soon will be litigating their sentences or convictions on appeal or in post-appellate proceedings. 7 Such a system cannot serve the purported goals of capital punishment-deterrence and retribution. Nor can the death penalty be administered evenhandedly under such a system; indeed, selection of those who have been executed has been exceedingly aberrant. Moreover, there is no likelihood that the system or its outcomes will change sufficiently to serve acceptably the stated purposes of capital punishment.
In effect, the system of capital punishment is a jural version of the Heisenberg uncertainty principle, which asserts, for the physical sciences, that the act of observing a physical phenomenon may itself distort the phenomenon under observation. In a similar fashion, the scrupulous but necessary review of capital sentencing so affects the system that it cannot accomplish its purposes. Only a complete revision of our political and legal system, which is not foreseeable, or the abolition of capital punishment can resolve this dilemma.
I. Scrutiny of Capital Sentences
Statistics on the use of the death penalty in the United States, particularly for the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, are imprecise; different sources frequently conflict. But by the most conservative estimate, there have been 5,707 executions since 1864.8 Of those executed, only 7 . See NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc., Death Row, U.S.A. 1 (April 20, 1982) [hereinafter cited as Death Row U.S.A.] The numbers in this Article that indicate numbers of persons on death row or the legal status of their convictions and sentences are derived from information gathered by the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund (LDF) since 1975 and, before then, by Douglas Lyons, who between 1970 and 1972 was a staff member at LDF. Before and after working for LDF, Lyons directed Citizens Against Legalized Murder (CALM), an anti-capital punishment organization that also gathered information later incorporated into LDF statistics. The information is collated periodically and circulated by the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund in Death Row, U.S.A. The statistics for years prior to 1975 are reliable but, because of CALM's limited resources, not highly so. For recent years the information is highly accurate, although on occasion inaccuracies have been discovered. In any event, the information is the best available, and is cited by the courts, e.g., Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 439 nn. 7 & 8 (1980) , the media, e.g., U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, May 11, 1981, at 72, and scholars, e.g., Gillers, Deciding Who Dies, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 2 n.2 (1980) . The Appendix to this Article refines Death Row, US.A. statistics further, principally by taking into account reimposition of the death penalty on a single defendent following new trial or new sentencing proceedings, and multiple impositions on a single defendant for more than one crime. It also reflects the correction of errors occasionally discovered in Death Row, US.A.
See Teeters & Zibulka, Executions under State Authority-An Inventory, reprinted in W. BOWERS, EXECUTIONS IN AMERICA app. A (1974)
. This catalogue does not include executions performed under local rather than state authorities. Most of the information in the Teeters-Zibulka inventory was supplied by wardens from the records of the departments of corrections of various states. By contrast, using data from The National Prisoner Statistics "Executions" bulletin, the Chicago Tribune, and other sources, Bedau estimated that a total of 7, 226 3,593 appealed their cases to the highest state courts;9 325 took their cases to the Supreme Court of the United States; and 129 sought relief through habeas corpus in the federal district courts.' 0 Thus, even assuming a wide margin of error, in years past a large number of death sentences were executed without exhaustion of legal remedies that today are commonplace.
This failure to appeal death sentences in many past cases, however, is not surprising. Automatic review of capital sentences was not required in many states until the 1930's or later." Indeed, at the time of Gary Gilmore's death sentence in Utah in 1976, automatic appeal to that state's highest court was not available. 2 Of course, defendants have had the option to appeal, but many have not exercised it, in largest part because of poverty.' 3 Virtually all capital defendants have been poor," and free legal services have not been readily available. Even after the Supreme Court interpreted the Constitution to require that states provide free counsel in felony cases," s lawyers ordinarily were not provided to seek Supreme Court review,' 6 even in capital cases.' 7 Even had counsel been provided to and department of corrections records from various states to compile his listing. He has confirmed and documented a total of 12,839 executions carried out under civil authority from colonial times through August 8, 1981. While Mr. Espy's listing includes some omissions from the Teeter-Zibulka listing, his much larger total figure is primarily due to the large number of executions performed under local, rather than state, authority well into the 1950 Until 1962, only one volunteer group of lawyers, New Jersey Citizens Against the Death Penalty, Inc., existed solely for the purpose of undertaking appeals on behalf of indigent defendants. Its activities were limited by the magnitude of the task and a lack of funds. Even today lawyers appointed for the trial or state appeal of capital cases frequently "bail out" after state supreme court affirmance. See Amicus Curiae Memorandum of Law, supra note 14, at 7 n.6 (listing certiorari petitions filed late due to sudden departure of assigned counsel in capital cases); ABA House of Delegates, Section of Criminal Justice, Recommendation No. 102B (Feb. 1979) . Volunteers usually replace them, but finding a replacement is often difficult.
18. 372 U.S. 391 (1963) (rejecting concepts that had traditionally inhibited the administration of federal habeas corpus remedy-such as "adequate state ground," "waiver," and "failure to exhaust state remedies"-and holding the writ available to any state prisoner who had not "deliberately bypassed" the assertion of federal rights).
19. These rights included the right to a certain standard of proof, see In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) (due process clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged), the right against self-incrimination, see The genesis of that effort to scrutinize capital cases has been described elsewhere; but briefly, it began with a campaign to eliminate the discriminatory application of the death penalty for rape." 0 Between 1930 and the present, of the 455 persons executed for rape, 405 were black and two were members of other minorities. 21 Almost 90% of those executed were black men convicted for the rape of white women. 2 On the basis of this racial disparity, the NAACP Legal Defense Fund undertook in the mid-1960's to invalidate the death penalty for rape. 23 But because counsel in such cases owed their clients the obligation of raising all relevant substantial issues, they chose to attack the death penalty not only on the issue of racial inequality, but also on such general grounds as the exclusion of jurors with scruples against capital punishment, and the arbitrariness of its imposition. Moreover, issues not directly related to the death penalty also came under careful review. Counsel raised issues such as the right to counsel, illegal search and seizure, coerced confession, and discrimination in jury selection, as well as state law questions concerning the admissibility of evidence, charge to the jury, and the like. A number of organizations, aided by volunteer lawyers and public defenders, gradually became involved in the effort, Although the effort commenced with rape cases, the non-racial issues raised were not by nature confined to such cases; consequently, these issues were presented in all capital cases. The program, therefore, continued even after the death penalty for rape was held unconstitutional in Coker v. Georgia. 2 1 Substantial racial disparities persist, however, in capital cases for other crimes.
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This campaign means that almost all current capital cases will receive careful examination in post-trial and post-appellate proceedings. It has resulted in a virtual moratorium on executions in the United States since 1967. Only four men have been put to death: John Spenkelink died involuntarily after exhausting his legal appeals 27 while Gary Gilmore," Jesse Bishop, 29 and Steven Judy" refused to pursue available post-conviction review and permitted the state to execute them." Except in such instances, where defendants eschew efforts to upset their convictions or sentences, never again will there be executions without appellate and post-conviction review.
II. Constitutional Constraints on the Death Penalty
The systematic review of capital cases that began after 1967 has resulted in various constitutional limits on the imposition of capital punishment. Courts and juries must sentence rationally and according to uniform standards," and higher standards of appellate review are required in capital than in other cases. 33 Yet this attempt to constitutionalize capital punishment has not reduced the heavy and erratic flow of death-sentenced defendants onto and off of death row.
A. Furman v. Georgia
In 1972, in Furman v. Georgia, 34 the Supreme Court introduced the requirement that sentencing be conducted according to rational standards, thus holding unconstitutional capital punishment as then administered in the United States. Although nine separate opinions accompanied the Court's per curiam decision, it is fair to say that the case stands for the proposition that capital punishment, as then administered, was inflicted arbitrarily or "freakishly,"" as one of the Justices put it, and was therefore cruel and unusual. It could be upheld only if it were applied regularly and evenhandedly. Justices Marshall and Brennan 7 thought capital punishment unconstitutional under any circumstances, while Justice Douglas apparently thought it unconstitutional because it was administered in a discriminatory fashion against minorities and the poor. 3 32. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 188-95, reh'g denied, 429 U.S. 875 (1976) . See also Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 519-21 (1968) (potential jurors who oppose capital punishment can be struck from jury only if their beliefs are such that they would automatically vote against death penalty regardless of evidence). Normally death sentence statutes provide for a three-tiered sentencing process after conviction. First, a separate sentencing proceeding is conducted where the jury (or the judge in a case tried without a jury) hears additional evidence in mitigation or aggravation of punishment. Second, the judge imposes sentence guided by the jury's recommendation. Third, the state supreme court automatically reviews all cases in which death has been imposed. , 1980) , the appendix, which is more precise, sets it as 715. 59. On any given date, the death row population contains some prisoners whose sentences or convictions have been or certainly will be invalidated, but that have not yet actually been reduced to a term of years. It is unrealistic to include them in the death row population. Therefore, in calculating percentages, this article uses the December 1980 population figure, but adjusts it for those who left subsequently or were slated soon to leave. This is the "adjusted December 1980" figure, which is calculated by subtracting the numbers known to have been invalidly sentenced from the numbers of those still on death row.
To arrive at the adjustment, the following decisions have been taken into account. In January, 1981, Oregon's Supreme Court declared its capital sentencing statute unconstitutional and four inmates were taken off the death row roster. Yet it might be argued that using a post-Furman starting point, after which states and prosecutors had a better idea of how to proceed in death cases, more accurately characterizes the system of capital punishment now in use. As of December 20, 1980, 1533 defendants had been sentenced to death under statutes adopted following Furman." 2 But if only 596 remained on death row," then 937-over 60%-had left or would soon leave death row. Furthermore, neither the 79% nor the 60% reversal rate for capital sentences takes into account prisoners on death row whose cases are still being litigated actively. Some percentage, and possibly a high percentage, of those prisoners will have their death sentences overturned.
Either the 60% or 75% rate of reversal in capital cases is staggeringly high compared to the reversal rate in ordinary criminal cases. For example, federal criminal judgments that are appealed have a reversal rate of 6.5%,"
. and in California If not, will judicial reversals continue to limit the death row population, or will execution commence in earnest, controlling and ultimately reducing the death row population? Alternatively, will capital punishment be abolished?
Three factors help to answer these questions. First, such reversible errors are more likely to decrease if in the past they have been few and simple, rather than varied and numerous. If sufficiently diverse, we may fairly conclude that there is something fatally flawed about the capital convicting and sentencing process. Even if it is possible to patch up one or two defects, or even half a dozen or more, the remaining system will continue to generate frequent reversible error. Second, the number of reversals in capital cases will decrease if capital defendants choose not to exhaust their legal remedies prior to execution, if review procedures are truncated, or if the grounds for error are reduced. Finally, a viable capital punishment system requires that public opinion accept a dramatic increase in the number of executions.
A. Reversals in Capital Cases: The Various Grounds
In fact, the courts have found so many different grounds for reversal in capital cases that numerous errors are likely to be made in the future. One category of reversals is that of persons sentenced to death who are subsequently found innocent, who are acquitted following a new trial, or who are found guilty of a noncapital offense rather than a capital one. In one case, for example, the state had withheld evidence relevant to the case, 7 under 10% of all appeals but only approximately .8% of the 41,000 convictions. See id. at 81 (Table X-A) (285 reversed for retrial, 32 with no retrial possible, and 7% dismissed).
Nor is California atypical. while in another four cases the defendants were released after another person's confession to the crime was corroborated. 68 There have been at least six other recent cases of defendants sentenced to death who later were determined to be not guilty. 69 In addition, there have been an indeterminate number of defendants who, after having been sentenced to death and having had their convictions reversed, were tried again and convicted of a non-capital offense, or who, having had their sentences vacated, were resentenced to less than a life sentence. 7 A much larger number of cases have held that the capitally sentenced defendant was convicted in violation of the Federal Constitution. The grounds of reversal include unreasonable search and seizure," violation of the Miranda rule, 72 denial of change of venue, 7 ' prosecutor's reference to defendant's refusal to testify, 74 coerced confession," denial of the right to compulsory process, 76 denial of the right to an impartial jury," denial of the right of confrontation, 7 " and incompetence of counsel." In addition to capital convictions, capital sentences have continued to be reversed. The Supreme Court has upset capital sentences based upon Witherspoon, s " the vagueness of the sentencing statute, 8 ex parte consultation of probation reports to the judge, 2 double jeopardy, 8 3 and admission of impermissible psychiatric testimony. 4 State courts have reversed sentences because of ex post facto application of a statute," suppression by the prosecutor of exculpatory evidence," and violation of the prohibition against double jeopardy. 7
Capital convictions and sentences have also been reversed on a large number of state law grounds. Oregon and Massachusetts have both invalidated the death penalty under their state constitutions. 8 Other state law grounds include conviction of a crime different from that charged in the indictment, 9 failure to charge concerning the credibility of witnesses," admission of hearsay evidence, 9 refusal to sever the trial of two defendants when counsel has a conflict of interest, 92 failure to sequester the jury, 93 misunderstanding about plea bargaining agreements, 94 and prosecutorial vindictiveness for refusal to plea bargain."'
B. Alternative Methods for Reducing Error in Capital Cases
Even if the various grounds for error in capital cases are so numerous that they are likely to be repeated, certain changes in the capital punishment system might nonetheless result in a system less prone to error in the future. Such changes might include: (1) capital defendants no longer seeking to exhaust every possible legal remedy before execution; (2) truncating the stages of review and the time taken to exhaust them; and (3) reducing the number of grounds for invalidating sentences and convictions.
The first possibility is highly unlikely. Only a minuscule number of capitally sentenced defendants have sought suicide by execution. 96 The rest will litigate until there is no possibility of proceeding further. Their capacity to contest the death penalty is enhanced by the availability of volunteer and court-appointed counsel, public defenders, and public-interest law firms. Furthermore, recent decisions indicate that third parties now will be able to contest the death sentences of at least some who purport to waive their rights. 7 Efforts to limit substantially federal post-conviction review face serious obstacles. Indeed, the number of capitally sentenced defendants who have been found innocent argues powerfully against adopting limitations that would have allowed them to be executed. The much larger number who have been found illegally or unfairly convicted or sentenced argues with similar force. Consequently, suggestions that capital litigation be expedited have been criticized severely. 8 Nevertheless, it is possible that some limits will be imposed on federal post-conviction review. There have been proposals to limit federal habeas corpus, 99 There also is no reason to believe that there will be a drastic reduction in the number of errors found in capital convictions or sentences. First, states have blatantly violated clear legal standards in the past. For example, after Witherspoon, any law student who had studied criminal or constitutional law knew that the Texas statute, which excluded from jury service potential jurors who might be "affected" because the case is capital, was unconstitutional. 0 2 Yet, Texas kept the law on the books and applied it for twelve years. 03 What explains the failure of Texas and other states to comply with clear constitutional standards? Perhaps it is inertia, lack of comprehension, or resistance to change. Certainly, the extraordinary range of errors found in capital cases suggests that absent some drastic and unforeseeable change in circumstances, many errors will continue to occur.
Second, although these errors occur in non-capital cases as well, for good reasons a higher level of certainty is required in capital cases. As the Supreme Court reiterated in Beck v. Alabama," 4 the risk of assigning the death penalty when a lesser penalty might be the appropriate result "cannot be tolerated in a case in which the defendant's life is at stake. As we have often stated, there is a significant constitutional difference between the death penalty and lesser punishments . ...
Third, the methods we have had, the methods we now have, and any conceivable method of awarding the death penalty involve contradictions and unreliability that will generate mistakes. For example, Furman correctly pointed out that like cases had been treated differently, indicating freakish and arbitrary application of the death penalty. In response, guided discretion laws were enacted. Then, in 1978, Lockett v. Ohio' 0 6 rightfully condemned the Ohio guided discretion law for employing a fixed list of mitigating circumstances and not requiring juries to consider any and all mitigating circumstances. In that case Sandra Lockett, sentenced to death, was only 18 and had never fired a shot. She had been outside a pawn shop when, unknown to and unplanned by her, a compan-ion who had entered the shop to commit a robbery killed the pawnbroker. The Supreme Court held that the sentencer should have had the opportunity to take into account her background and character and the circumstances of the crime, even though the statutory list of mitigating circumstances precluded his doing so. Justice Rehnquist argued in dissent that leaving the list of mitigating factors wide open was a return to the preFurman period, when "similar cases" were treated differently. In a sense he is correct. On the one hand, similar cases should be treated similarly; but on the other, each case is different, if only because every individual is unique. Both the majority and the dissent were right, each according to its own terms. If capital punishment is retained, there is no solution to this dilemma.
C. The Role of Public Opinion
It appears that in recent years public opinion has increasingly favored capital punishment. This increase suggests that prosecutorial and legislative efforts to impose the death penalty may become more successful. This increase may, however, be more apparent than real. 107 Even if it is real, the spectacle of increased executions might moderate public support for futher implementation of capital punishment. During the period in which the United States in fact carried out executions, public support for capital punishment decreased." 0 '
In order to make the capital punishment system viable, the execution rate would have to rise significantly above that countenanced in modern times. Before there could be any reduction of the death row population, which is now over 1000,09 it would be necessary to kill 200 defendants each year just to offset the new arrivals on death row. In the decade of the 1960's, prior to the moratorium on executions, there was an average of 19.1 executions per year. 10 The sixties were atypical, however, because of the developing moratorium and the large number of stays leading up to it. Potentially more representative are the 1950's, when the average number of executions per year was 72, or the 1940's, when it was 128. The 1930's had the highest annual rate, with an average of 152 executions per year.
The peak year was 1935, with 199 executions."' Although that rate might keep even with accessions to death row today, it would not bring about a net reduction in the death row population. One might, of course, challenge the relevance of these historical statistics on the ground that the country is now much larger. But the growth of the total population is offset by other factors: there are more abolitionist states today, and some crimes-such as rape-are no longer capital. Are we likely to kill 199 plus per year? It is not unreasonable to assume that the country today, if it undertook legal killing, would countenance killing no more than we did in the sixties or perhaps the fifties.
Most countries of western civilization do not execute at all. Great Britain, the countries of Western Europe, and Canada have all abolished capital punishment.' 12 Were the United States to resume executions at the current rate of death sentences imposed every year, some 200, we would put ourselves in the company of South Africa, which according to Amnesty International executed 67 persons in 1976,"1 the Soviet Union, which publishes no statistics but according to Andrei Sakharov executes "several hundreds" per year,' " and Iran, which Amnesty International reports executed more than 300 between 1972 and 1976,11 a rate that has increased since the Islamic Revolution."" This international comparison suggests that the most we would do, should killings begin in earnest, still would not deplete the death row population.
Therefore, in view of the vigor and frequency of appeals that defendants will press, the likelihood that review will continue to remain available to correct unacceptable injustices that otherwise would result in executions, the careful scrutiny that will continue to focus on capital cases, the inherent contradictions of the capital sentencing process, and the moral constraints limiting the number of executions this country will accept, capital punishment will continue to be relatively infrequent in years to come. It certainly will not be so frequent that death row executions will equal new arrivals. 
IV. The Inevitable Failure of the Capital Punishment System
It is likely, then, that we shall continue to have a capital punishment system substantially unchanged from that of the last fifteen years. While sentencing hundreds to death per year, that system accomplishes death row population control mainly by judicial review and only rarely by killing. It is a roller coaster system of capital justice, in which large numbers of people are constantly spilling into and out of death row, but virtually no actual executions take place. Yet, if we are to have any legal executions in this country, it must be under this type of system. Such a system has not only proved necessary to assure that innocent people are not executed, that constitutional rights are not violated, and that invidious considerations such as race are not the true motivating forces behind executions; it also accurately reflects, it seems, our civilized society's fundamental unwillingness actually to kill the hundreds of people that the decisions of judges and juries place on death row each year.
Administering capital punishment in this way has not, however, avoided the arbitrariness of the pre-Furman system of capital punishment. While Furman and Gregg have required that like cases be treated as similarly as possible, taking into account the aggravating and mitigating factors in each case, another element must be worked into the equation: the competence of prosecutors, defense counsel, and courts-all those who collectively administer the criminal justice system. A defendant who is viewed as less offensive than many who have been spared death may be put to death because of how the justice system worked, not because of his or her individual qualities or the nature of the crime. Errors by these administrators of the justice system that bring about reversals of convictions occur without regard to the egregiousness of the defendant or the crime he or she has committed. An error of the type in Witherspoon, Lockett, Estelle v. Smith, or Jurek may insulate from the death penalty the most horrible individual and the most egregious crime. The case of the only person involuntarily put to death since 1967, John Spenkelink, illustrates that the variables in the lottery are beyond the control of anyone who desires to make it work fairly. He was a drifter who killed a fellow drifter traveling companion. The man he killed had beaten and sodomized him and stolen his money. Spenkelink said that he had struck back in retaliation. Ray Marky, the Florida Assistant Attorney General who represented the State in Spenkelink, has said, "In fact, I really felt that he was probably the least obnoxious individual on death row in terms of the crime he committed. . . I didn't have some hideous monster . . . who strangled three generations of women. We had a guy who killed a Moreover, it may be that the use of judicial review to control death row populations invites the very errors that such review is designed to correct. Consider the Private Slovik phenomenon."' During World War II, the only American serviceman the armed forces executed for a capital crime-in his case, desertion-was Private Slovik. Those who participated in the death penalty process at lower levels did not expect him to die, but wanted to make him an example for others. They assumed that someone else further up the line would recall the death sentence. No one did. There is some evidence that those involved in the capital sentencing process, observing the numerous reversals, may suppress doubts about imposing the death penalty because they think someone else will rescind the order to execute." 9 No theoretical penological justification for the death penalty supports the capital punishment system as it is now administered. Whatever view one takes of the deterrent capacity of the death penalty when it is the swift and certain result of criminal activity, the current, roller coaster system-though absolutely necessary to protect the innocent from execution, to safeguard basic constitutional rights, and to avoid racially motivated executions-makes swift and certain executions impossible. A hypothetical killer who calculates his chances of being executed before committing homicide must calculate that he or she is quite unlikely to be put to death. Likewise, whatever retributive function capital punishment might serve, assuming that executions dissipate the anger of victims' families and friends or the public, cannot be served by the current system of capital justice, in which executions occur only rarely and after great delay. Alternatively, if the purpose of capital punishment is incapacitation, since a death sentence has come to mean life imprisonment in virtually all cases, the death penalty surely has not incapacitated offenders any more effectively than would actual sentences of life imprisonment. In short, in all of its inconstancy, vacillation, and ungainliness, the system not only looks irrational but serves no purpose. Nevertheless, despite the fact that the administration of capital punishment in the United States is a lurching roller coaster whose trip is punctuated by occasional, irrational executions, capital punishment will continue for a time. The commitment to keep it and the reluctance to use it are too great for change to occur. Sooner or later, however, we will have to come to the conclusion that there is no way to make a capital punishment system work. If we want to retain our American system of fairness, legality, and equality, capital punishment can proceed only in its current form. The price of actually using capital punishment at a rate that would make it workable would be overturning volumes of constitutional and legal rights that protect us in a wide range of other concerns unrelated to capital punishment.
The United States is not willing to undertake widespread repeal of basic constitutional and legal protections in order to execute substantial numbers of death-sentenced prisoners on a regular basis. But to continue the death penalty with those necessary constraints inevitably violates the basic precept of Furman, that capital punishment may be inflicted only evenhandedly, not arbitrarily or "freakishly." Although a five-to-four decision, Furman is now firmly entrenched in constitutional jurisprudence, having been affirmed in Gregg v. Georgia, 12 Lockett v. Ohio,' and Godfrey v Georgia.
2 2 The response of the states to Furman was a valiant effort to introduce evenhandedness where irregularity had prevailed. But the outcome has been no more successful than that of the prior system of capital punishment. This failure has not resulted from lack of effort but rather from the impossibility of fashioning an acceptable method of administering capital punishment while maintaining the system of rights that our Constitution mandates.
